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BEYOND "SELLOUTS" AND "RACE CARDS":
BLACK ATTORNEYS AND THE
STRAITJACKET OF LEGAL PRACTICE

Margaret M. Russell*
J.

INTRODUCTION: REPRESENTING RACE

For attorneys of color, the concept of "representing race" within
the context of everyday legal practice is neither new nor voluntarily
learned; at a basic level, it is what we do whenever we enter a court
room or conference room in the predominantly white legal system
of this country. The ineluctable visibility of racial minorities in the
legal profession, as well as the often unspoken but nevertheless
deeply felt sense of racially hierarchical positioning to which this
visibility subjects us, are aptly expressed in the following droll rec
ollection of a 1960s-era Black civil rights lawyer:
A favorite story among Southern black attorneys was of the black
lawyer who was to argue a case before the Mississippi Supreme Court.
He had prepared his briefs with great precision and scholarship, and
was quite confident that the law was in favor of his client - that is, as
confident as a black lawyer can be in a �outhern court. However, in
his concentration on the law, he had neglected to look up the proper
way to address the Supreme Court before beginning his argument. A
stylized, formal address is always used in speaking to an appellate
court, differing from court to court, but it's usually some variation of
"May it please the distinguished Chief Justice and the distinguished
Associate Justices of this Honorable Court." Being forced to call
upon his instinct for an improvised form of address, he arose, looked
up and down the bench, and said, "Good morning, white folks." His
brief could not have stated the issue of the case more realistically and
precisely than this spontaneous greeting.1

Although it is often assumed that people of color initiate or
even "instigate". extemporaneous comments about race in legal pro* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; A.B. 1979,
Princeton; J.D. 1984, J.S.M. 1990, Stanford. - Ed. I am grateful to Margalynne Annstrong,
Naomi Cahn, Ellen Kreitzberg, and Gerald Uelmen for reading an earlier draft of this essay;
to June Carlbone for especially detailed commentary; to Stephanie Mirande for expert re
search assistance; and to Lee Haltennan for all-encompassing support.
1. Edward A. Dawley, Black People Don't Have Legal Problems, Address at the Tom
Paine Summer Law School (summer 1970), in THE RELEVANT LAWYERS: CONVERSATIONS
OUT OF CoURT ON THEIR CUENTS, THEIR PRACTICE, THEIR POLITICS, THEIR LIFE STYLE
219, 220-21 (Ann Fagan Ginger ed., 1972) [hereinafter THE RELEVANT LAWYERS].
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ceedings, the reality is that many people of color - like.the Black
lawyer in the tale above - simply articulate a subtext that is un
mentioned but obvious: that their minority racial presence is forced
into stark and distorted relief against an otherwise seemingly
"transparent" background of white omnipresence.2 Attorneys of
color often find that they are identified, categorized, and evaluated
first as members of their racial group, and only secondarily - if at
all - as lawyers. In this sense, "representing race" is a fundamen
tal and inescapable part of minority attorneys' professional identity
and political function as marginalized actors in the mainstream
legal system, quite apart from and transcendent of the particulars of
individual client representation. As suggested above, this phenom
enon derives its salience from two factors: the paucity of people of
color in the legal profession;3 and the debasing and racially prejudi
cial slights to which they are subjected on a recurrent basis.4
Regarding the first factor, minority attorneys still suffer from
severe underrepresentation in the legal profession. At the begin
ning of this decade, Blacks, Asian Americans, Latinos and Latinas,
and Native Americans comprised only twelve percent of the
2. Barbara Flagg defines "transparency" as the proclivity of whites to think of themselves
as "raceless" unless they are in situations in which juxtaposition with people of color renders
racial differences obvious: "The most striking characteristic of whites' consciousness of
whiteness is that most of the time we don't have any. I call this the transparency phenome
non: the tendency of whites not to think about whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, exper
iences, or perspectives that are white-specific." Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I
See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 953, 957 (1993} [hereinafter Flagg, Was Blind]; see also Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a
Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009,
2013 (1995) [hereinafter Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy]. For an extended application
of the concept of transparency to the historical and legal construction of white racial identity,
see IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHrrE BY LAw: THE LEGAL CoNsTRucnoN OF RACE (1996).
3. See generally TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A.B.A., RE
PORT WITii RECOMMENDATIONS (1986) (recommending adoption by the ABA of policies to
integrate the legal profession and create more opportunities for Ininority lawyers); Ramsey
Campbell, State's Legal System Lacks Minorities, Commission Says; Racial and Ethnic Bias
Study Concludes Underrepresentation Has Created an Unfair System, ORLANDO SENTINEL
TRIB., Nov. 14, 1991, at Dl; Rita Henley Jensen, Minorities Didn't Share in Firm Growth,
NATL LJ., Feb. 19, 1990, at 1; Steven Keeva, Unequal Partners: It's Tough at the Top for
Minority Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 50; Alexander Stille, Little Room at the Top for
Blacks, Hispanics; Outlook Better for Women, Asians, NATL. L.J., Dec. 23, 1985, at 1; Doreen
Weisenhaus, Still a Long Way to Go for Women, Minorities: White Males Dominate Firms,
NATL L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 1. Racial exclusion is revealed by not only the number of practic
ing lawyers, but of law faculty and law students as well. See, e.g., Minority Women Lagging in
Law Faculties, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at A19; Saundra Torry, At Yale Law, a Gender Gap
in Who Gets Clerkships Sparks Debate, WASH. Posr, May 13, 1991, at F5 (reporting on gen
der and race disparities in the selection of Jaw students for clerkships).
4. See generally Claudia MacLachlan, Legal Bias: Attorneys See Discriminatiolz, ST.
Loms Posr-DISPATCH, Dec. 3, 1989, at El; David Margolick, Bar Group Is Told of Racial
Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1985, at 15; Lena Williams, For the Black Professional, the
Obstacles Remain, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1987, at A16; Jeannie Wong, Panel Hears How Mi
norities See Court System, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 11, 1992, at Bl.
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nation's law students, less than eight percent of lawyers, eight per
cent of law professors, and two percent of the partners at the na
tion's largest law firms.5 When compared with the overall
percentage of people of color in the national population - approxi
mately twenty-five percent6 - these paltry figures illustrate the ex
tent to which attorneys of color are still very much a token presence
in the legal system.7 Worse still, this phenomenon doubly exacer
bates the conditions of isolation experienced by minority lawyers,
because their numbers are just high enough to undermine claims of
white racial exclusivity in the profession, yet far too low to facilitate
the comforting sense of belonging or even anonymity that attaches
quite naturally to white lawyers.8
The double bind that tokenization imposes on minority attor
neys is the pressure to comport themselves generally as though the
legal profession is integrated, colorblind, and even raceless, yet to
take on the burdens - gratefully! - of role-modeling and other
wise representing their race on the occasional race commission or
diversity committee instituted by their colleagues to manifest con
cern for the plight of minorities. Thus, minority attorneys, even
while expressing their desire to volunteer to assist communities of
color within and outside the legal profession, sometimes complain
that they are somehow expected "naturally" to take on the emo
tional and temporal demands of extra "race work" as though

5. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY:
MEntoD 53-54 (1994) (citing Jensen, supra note 3, at 1).

ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE

6. See RHODE, supra note 5, at 53.
7. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 28-29.
8. Invoking her everyday personal experiences as a white woman, Peggy Mcintosh attributes this sense of ease to white privilege, which she describes as
an invisible package of unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but
about which I was "meant" to remain oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible
weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes,
tools, and blank checks.
Peggy Mcintosh, Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, CREATION SPIRITUAL
ITY, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 33. For additional recent works advancing a theoretical critique of
white privilege and its effects on legal and social relations, see CRmCAL WHITE STUmes:
LooKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., forthcoming 1997);
L6PEZ, supra note 2; STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How lNVISI·
BLE PRIVILEGE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996); Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One:
Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 695 (1996); Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy,
supra note 2; Flagg, Was Blind, supra note 2; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARv. L. REv. 1709 (1993); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transforma
tion, 143 PENN. L. REv. 1659 (1995); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice
and Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J L & FEMINISM 217 {1993); David
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921,
946-95 {1996).
.
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If tokenization represents the first set of problems confronting
minority attorneys, a second set of obstacles may be attributed to
the daily, unrelenting mistreatment to which many nlinority attor
neys are subjected. Attorneys of color often find their everyday
professional and personal encounters peppered with reminders of
their minority status in the legal system.10 For example, the New
York Judicial Commission on Minorities found that fourteen per
cent of its surveyed litigators asserted that judges, lawyers, or court
room personnel publicly repeat ethnic jokes, use racial epithets, or
make demeaning remarks about a minority group "often" or "very
often"; another twenty-three percent sta�ed that such comments oc
cur "sometimes."11 Moreover, minorities in the legal profession re

port anecdotally that outside the legal setting - for example, in
pursuing such mundane tasks as hailing taxis,12 boarding eleva
tors,13 shopping for clothes,14 or driving down the street1s - they
9. On the burdens of "race work," see Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a
Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want To Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1222,
1226-27 (1991). Delgado writes:
Suppose you saw a large sign saying, "ROLE MODEL WANTED. GOOD PAY.
INQUIRE WITHIN." Would you apply? Let me give you five reasons you should not.
Reason Number One. Being a role model is a tough job, with long hours and much
heavy lifting. You are expected to uplift your entire people. Talk about hard, sweaty
work!
Id. (footnotes omitted).
10. A common complaint among minority attorneys is that in legal proceedings they are
often presumed to be nonattorneys, e.g., criminal defendants, bailiffs, spectators, or - if
female - court reporters or parties' wives. See, e.g., Editorial, N.J. HERALD & NEws, Sept.
16, 1991, at A4, quoted in RHODE, supra note 5, at 125 n.36 ( 'I 'll come into the courtroom
wearing a $500 suit with a legal folder full of briefs under my arm and the courtroom official
or guard will order me into the defendant's chair,' said Newark attorney Robert L. Brown, a
black man. 'They just assume automatically that if you're black, you're the one on trial.' ").
11. See Arthur S. Hays & Arny Stevens, Racism Is Said to Pervade New York Courts,
WALL ST. J., June 5, 1991, at B6.
12. "Taxi stories" - describing the inability to hail a cab because of the cab driver's
trepidation of the would-be passenger's skin color - are prevalent in the experiences of
urban professionals of color, particularly Black males. The taxi story even entered the ranks
of Hollywood movie mythology in the legal thriller The Pelican Brief, in which the swash
buckling hero played by Denzel Washington is stymied in his efforts to chase down an investi
gative lead because he cannot hail a taxi on the street in Washington, D.C. See also HENRY
Loms GATES, JR., LoosE CANONS: NoTES ON nm CULTURE WARS 147 (1992); CoRNEL
WEST, RAcE MATIERS, at ix-xvi (1993).
13. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law
Professor, 6 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 46, 49-51 (1991) (describing two white women's refusal
to board an elevator in a "luxury condominium" with "five well-dressed Black women in
their thirties and forties"); Peggy C. Davis, Law as Mzcroaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 156061 (1989) (recounting a white female passenger's ridicule of a Black woman waiting to board
the elevator).
14. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-51 (1991)
(chronicling the author's exclusion from Benetton, a chic clothing store).
"
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are visually "sized up" according to their color rather than the ac
coutrements of upper-middle-class professional status that they
thought might insulate them from suspicion.16 The debilitating, lin
gering effects of such routine and recurrent degrading treatment
should not be underestimated as significant influences in the forma
tion of professional identity. Most attorneys of color are forced to
invoke the prevailing lawyerly ethos of becoming thick-skinned and
detached - that is, if they hope to remain in the profession with
their sanity and composure reasonably intact. This response, com
bined with other age-old survival mechanisms used by people of
color trapped in racist environments, usually helps render everyday
interactions tolerable. But it would be naive to assume that the
above factors - tokenization and everyday, microaggressive har
assment - do not exert a profound and destabilizing impact upon
minority lawyers' conceptions of professionalism, attorney-client in
teraction, case selection, lawyering strategy, courtroom behavior,
and a host of other concerns. For women of color in the legal pro
fession, gender bias further exacerbates the burdens of "high visibil
ity, few mentors and role models, and additional counseling and
committee responsibilities."17 Although research literature infre
quently addresses the particular obstacles faced by those also dis
criminated against on the basis of sexual orientation or disability,
one might well imagine the inhibitory effects of those factors as
well.
Therefore, when a symposium such as this focuses much-needed
scholarly attention on the possible intersections of critical theory
and progressive practice with respect to the representation of race
in the legal process, it is crucial to keep in mind that attorneys of
color bring vastly different experiences from those of white attor15. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 691 n.76 (1995) (quoting Henry L. Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of
Looking At A Black Man, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 58 (relating common exper
iences of prominent Black men who have been subjected to vehicle stops by the police and
noting that "Blacks - in particular, black men - swap their [negative] experiences of police
encounters like war stories, and there are few who don't have more than one story to tell
There's a moving violation that many African-Americans know as D.W.B.: Driving While
Black")).
16. Sadly, the tacit acknowledgement of class hierarchy in the telling of these tales is as
lamentable as are the lessons of racial bias. What, one wonders, do these anecdotes reveal
about assumptions made regarding the humanity of people of color who could never afford
to take cabs, shop at upscale stores, dine in swanky restaurants, or drive BMWs?
17. Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1191
(1988). Few sources document the unique biases faced by women of color in the legal profes
sion. For compelling accounts of the personal experiences of Black women in legal educa
tion, see generally Black Women Law Professors: Building a Community at the Intersection
of Race and Gender, a Symposium, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990-91).
• • . •
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neys to the underlying issues at hand. Regardless of which specialty
or career path within the legal profession minority attorneys
choose, they face a distinctly different set of obstacles than do
whites, particularly in cases potentially involving racial issues.
Although recent scholarship in lawyering theory has been quite illu
minating in exploring a broad array of themes concerning the so
cially constructed nature of client identity and lawyer identity in
progressive practice, the role of race in these constructions deserves
greater attention.1s

In this essay, I focus on some of the pressures and constraints
faced by Black attorneys in particular when addressing issues of
race in legal proceedings.19 I argue that when issues of race are at
least arguably relevant factors in a case, Black attorneys face an
unduly restrictive set of choices, each of which carries impossible
burdens. Saddled with the tacit professional expectation of being
responsible for identifying, fixing, or rationalizing away race
problems
concerns

outside the courtroom, Black attorneys who raise such
in court often face a heavy burden of justifying either that

race really exists as an issue at all, or that they are competent to
address the topic of race in a fair and reasoned manner. When
Black attorneys articulate racism as a primary factor in a particular
case, they may encounter fractious demands that they "prove it," or
harsh accusations that they are "playing the race card" or otherwise
engaging in unprofessional behavior. Conversely, when Black at
torneys take on advocacy obligations that require the subordination
and decontextualization of issues of race in the service of other
18. Recent articles exploring these concerns include Anthony V . Alfieri, Defending Ra
cial Violence, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1301 (1995); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification
Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in
Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1807 (1993); Michelle S. Jacobs, Legitimacy and the
Power Game, 1 CuNICAL L. REv. 187 (1994); Symposium, Political Lawyering: Conversa
tions on Progressive Social Change, 31 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 285 (1996); David B. Wil
kins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux
Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1030 (1995); David B. Wtlkins, Two Paths to the
Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Law
yers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1981 (1993).
19. Some of the observations expressed in this article about the quandaries faced by
Black lawyers might be applied to lawyers of minority-group status generally. However, the
Darden-Cochran conflict - and the set of race and legal practice issues that it embodies strikes me as particularly emblematic of burdens specifically faced by Black lawyers because
of the culturally distinct set of stereotypes endured by Blacks. In using expansive terms such
as "Black lawyers" and "Black communities," I am of course mindful of the diversity of
backgrounds and viewpoints that these labels necessarily include.
I also acknowledge that within the community of Black attorneys, other factors (e.g.,
gender and sexual orientation) signify other salient differences in experiences and perspec
tives. This article posits that the problems discussed herein apply to Black attorneys gener
ally, without delving into those additional dimensions.
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objectives, they may be labeled as "sellouts" who have abandoned
their communities. Whatever the choice, the focus of such cases
inevitably becomes not just race, but their race and their lawyerly
merits as well. Unlike white attorneys, who have the relatively lux
urious comfort of invisibility and transparency in raising issues of
race in the lawyering process, Black attorneys must always brace
themselves to have their racial, professional, and personal identities
placed in issue as well. This additional layer of scrutiny and suspi
cion may in tum raise for the Black attorney difficult professional
and personal questions of identity, autonomy, authenticity, and loy
alty. Unless, as suggested above, Black attorneys steel themselves
mentally and emotionally for the extra demands of race work in a
legal system that still operates on the unspoken assumption that fix
ing race problems is naturally the work of minorities, they are des
tined to lead professional lives of fatigue, frustration, and perhaps
exploitation.20 This in tum significantly undermines the social
justice imperatives that lead public-spirited Blacks - whether in
the private or public sectors - to select law as a career path in the
first place.
Thus, I argue, Black attorneys encounter not only a glass ceiling
barring their vertical and hierarchical career advancement, but a
type of glass bubble as well that severely circumscribes the flexibil
ity and creativity so critical to the Black lawyer's - or indeed any
lawyer's - professional identity. Stereotypical, externally imposed
assumptions about the role and function of Black attorneys have
the powerful effect of straitjacketing and asphyxiating Blacks in an
already highly restrictive environment. While it is important for
Black lawyers - like other lawyers - to subject themselves to rig
orous critique regarding the political and societal implications of
their career choices and professional behavior, I am wary of the
strong tendency of mainstream popular and legal discourses to find
ways to castigate Black attorneys for problems essentially not of
their creation. Thus, in evaluating the microcosm of Black legal
practice, it is essential to locate it within its macrocosm of con
structed racial meaning. The Black attorney generally is not ac
corded the respect, autonomy, or even anonymity enjoyed by her
white colleagues, and she is therefore doubly disadvantaged by the
imposition of careerist pigeonholes and expectations.
20. For a report on the enervating effects of tokenism on minority law professors, see
generally Roy L. Brooks, Life After Tenure: Can Minority Law Professors Avoid the Clyde
Ferguson Syndrome?, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 419 (1986); Richard Delgado, Minority Law Profes·
sors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349 {1989).
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To illustrate the straitjacketing that I suggest is quite typical in
the life of the Black attorney, I draw upon a seemingly atypical ex
ample: public commentary on the work of two prominent and now
infamous Black attorneys - prosecutor Christopher Darden and
defense attorney Johnnie Cochran in the murder prosecution of
O.J. Simpson. Because of the ubiquity of media coverage of the
trial - including the melodramatic effect of cameras in the court
room - Cochran and Darden rapidly became two of the most rec
ognizable Black lawyers in this nation's history. Only the televised
confrontation of Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill has exposed
Black attorneys so intensely to the voyeuristic scrutiny of the
American television-viewing public.21 Yet, a closer examination of
public attitudes toward Darden and Cochran reveals patterns quite
common in the treatment of Black lawyers generally.
Public (including media) reaction to the lawyering styles of
these two men in the so-called "Trial of the Century"22 exemplifies
what I describe below as the " 'Sellout' vs. 'Race Card' " trope:
when issues of race are even potentially relevant in a particular
case, Black attorneys are cabined within a false dichotomy of op
tions that implicate not just questions of lawyering strategy, but
public generalizations about their racial identities and professional
skills as well. The dichotomy is false because its components have
been erroneously constructed as opposites: (1) claiming the irrele
vance of race, or perhaps even denying so vehemently that racism is
at issue that one is branded an "assimilationist" or "sellout;" versus

(2) raising racism as an issue, thereby risking accusations that one is
recklessly "playing the race card" and pandering to racial tensions.
In my view, this putative oppositeness is a construct that ob
scures the complexity of the value and strategy choices faced by
Black attorneys in several ways. First, in the metanarrative or
"master narrative"23 of a predominantly white legal system, this
21. On the popular cultural mythology engendered by the Hill-Thomas hearings, see
Anna Deavere Smith, The Most Riveting Television: The Hill-Thomas Hearings and Popular
Culture, in RACE, GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF 'IHE HILL-THOMAS
HEARINGS 248 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995).
22. Gerald F. Uelmen wryly notes that his research "has uncovered at least thirty-two
trials since 1900 that have been called a 'trial of the century.' " GERALD F. UELMEN, LES
SONS FROM 'IHE TRIAL: THE PEOPLE V. 0.J. S!MPSON204 (1996).
23. See Lisa Lowe, Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity: Marking Asian American Dif
ferences, 1 DIASPORA 24, 26 (1991) (discussing the role of metanarratives or "master narra
tives" in imposing "minority" cultural identity upon Asian Americans). In discussing the role
of media discourses in sharpening tensions between African Americans and Korean Ameri
cans in the wake of the acquittal of the police officers in the first "Rodney King" trial, Lisa
Ikemoto observes: "I use 'master narrative' to describe white supremacy's prescriptive, con
flict-constructing power, which deploys exclusionary concepts of race and privilege in ways
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false construction of opposites serves the backlash function of fo
cusing attention on microcosms of intraracial conflict and public
criticisms of individual Black attorneys, rather than on the more
noxious legal and social contexts in which they operate. Second, it
straitjackets Black attorneys by stereotyping and unnecessarily re
stricting their choices of potential advocacy strategies. Finally, the
hyperbole surrounding the false dichotomy mischaracterizes the
meaning of community affiliation and racial identification to many
Black attorneys who are engaged in an ongoing struggle to be
viewed not as racial icons, but as real-life, three-dimensional human
beings.
Accordingly, this essay addresses the "Sellout"-"Race Card"
quandary in the following manner: Part II briefly sets forth as illus
trative the experiences of an earlier generation of Black attorneys
who faced overt challenges to their professional competence based
solely on their identities and experiences as Blacks. Part III de
scribes the "sellout" and "race card" tropes as used against Darden
and Cochran, respectively, in the Simpson case; I use these terms to
epitomize the constraints faced by Black attorneys as they struggle
through complex questions of race within the context of individual
cases. I conclude by urging Black attorneys to resist such straitjack
eting, particularly in the service of progressive antisubordination
lawyering strategies.
Given the almost overwhelming degree of fascination with the
O.J. Simpson case, its cultural and intellectual implications, and its
variable symbolic values,24 one major caveat bears mention and re
iteration: this is not an essay about the merits of the Simpson
case,zs nor about the personal characters or legal talents of Christothat maintain intergroup conflict." Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the
Story ofAfrican American I Kmean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles,"
66 S. CAL L. REv. 1581, 1582 (1993) (footnote omitted). I suggest that lkemoto's point
might be applied usefully to the role of the master narrative in maintaining intragroup con
flict - such as "Darden versus Cochran" or "sellouts versus race cards" - as well. See also
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Message of the Verdict: A Three-Act Morality Play Starring
Clarence Thomas, Willie Smith, and Mike Tyson, in RACE, GENDER, AND PO\VER IN
AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS HEARINGS, supra note 21, at 118 n.3 ("In
using the term 'Master Narrative' . . . I refer ...to the narrative of American society in which
the subordination of certain groups has been structured along race and gender lines.").
24. See Janny Scott, The Joy of Deconstructing O.J.: At Symposium, Deep Thoughts and
Cheap Thrills, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at Bl (analyzing scholarly obsession with deriving
social significance and historical lessons from the Simpson case). For a compelling analysis of
race and gender in both the OJ. Simpson and Susan Smith murder trials, see Cheryl I. Har
ris, The Foulston & Siefkin Lecture: Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson
and Susan Smith - Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN LJ. 225 (1996).
25: There are, of course, voluminous sources of information about this matter. Major
media have covered the case since its inception in June 1994 with the murders of Nicole
Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, and their preoccupation continued in connection with
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pher Darden and Johnnie Cochran. For what it is worth, I believe
that both men are talented lawyers committed in many respects to
racial justice and Black community betterment. Rather, my point is
to demonstrate that the public accentuation of the Cochran-Darden
conflict - as well as the valorization and vilification to which each
man has been subjected - reveals far more about the burdens
shared by all Black attorneys than about Cochran's and Darden's
individual differences.
II.

LESSONS FROM ELDERS:

THE

NEXUS BETWEEN RACE AND

THE UNDERMINING OF PROFESSIONAL CREDIBILITY

The achievements and visibility of a substantial number of
Blacks in the legal profession constitute a relatively new phenome
non, but tlie scrutiny and suspicion with which they are treated in
mainstream legal practice do not. Often, such distrust expresses an
underlying belief that being reasoned and objective as a legal pro
fessional - particularly with regard to issues of race - is somehow
at odds with the sustenance of Black racial identity. For example, a
generation ago, in Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International
Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Judge Leon Higginbotham was
called upon by defendants to recuse himself from a class action
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other civil rights
statutes. The state-initiated suit sought legal and equitable relief
against defendant union officials for alleged race discrimination
against the twelve Black complainants and the class they repre
sented. In their motion for recusal,27 the defendants argued that
Judge Higginbotham's status as a prominent Black civil rights
scholar and advocate rendered him unqualified to adjudicate claims
of race discrimination in a fair and impartial manner. In a lengthy
the civil trial of the Brown and Goldman families·against Simpson. In addition, many of the
attorneys on both sides of the criminal prosecution have published books about the trial. See,
e.g., JOHNNIE L. CoCHRAN, JR. WITH TIM RUTIEN, JouRNEY TO JusuCE (1996); CHruSTo
PHER A. DARDEN WflH JESS WALTER, IN CoNTEMPT (1996); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REA
SONABLE DOUBTS: THE OJ. SIMPSON CASE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996);
ROBERT L. SHAPIRO WITH LARKIN WARREN, THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: A DEFENSE AT
TORNEY'S BRIEF ON THE OJ. SIMPSON CASE (1996); UELMEN, supra note 22. Other recent
books about the case include VINCENT BuGuosr, OUTRAGE: THE F1VE REASONS WHY OJ.
SIMPSON GoT AWAY WITH MURDER (1996) and JEFFREY TooBIN, THE RuN OF His LIFE
(1996). Recently, a law journal devoted an entire issue to the topic of race and gender in the
Simpson case. See 6 HASTINGS WoMEN's L.J. 121 (1995).

26. 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
27. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) ("Whenever a

party to any proceeding in a dis
trict court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any ad
verse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned
·
to hear such proceeding.").
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and detailed consideration of the motion, Judge Higginbotham
summarized the defendants' reasons for requesting disqualification
as follows:
That "I [have] identified, and [do] identify, [myself] with causes of
blacks, including the cause of correction of social injustices which [I
believe] have been caused to blacks"; that I have made myself "a par
ticipant in those causes, including the cause of correction of social
injustices which [I believe] have been caused to blacks"; ... [t]hat "in
view of the applicable federal law," and by reason of my "personal
and emotional commitments to civil rights causes of the black com
munity, the black community expectation as to [my] leadership and
spokesmanship therein, and the basic tenet of our legal system requir
ing both actual and apparent impartiality in the federal courts," my
"continuation ... as trier of fact, molder of remedy and arbiter of all
issues constitutes judicial impropriety."28
28. 388 F. Supp. at 158 (quoting defendants' affidavits in support of the motion). In his
opinion denying the motion, Judge Higginbotham summarized the fifteen allegations relied
upon by the defendants in their affidavits. The accompanying text represents the court's
summary of the last two of these fifteen points, which I have chosen to excerpt because they
seem most emblematic of the charge of "bias" brought by the defendants. However, because
I do not wish to risk mischaracterizing or unfairly truncating the broad-ranging nature of
defendants' plethora of claims of bias, I include Judge Higginbotham's summary of their first
thirteen points as well:
1. That the instant case is a class action, brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
other civil rights statutes, charging that defendants have discriminated against the twelve
black plaintiffs and the class they represent on the basis of race, and seeking extensive
equitable and legal remedies for the alleged discrimination;
2. That I will try the instant case without a jury, and that I am black;
3. That on Friday, October 25, 1974, I addressed a luncheon meeting of the Association
for the Study of Afro-American Life and History, during the 59th Annual Meeting of
that organization, "a group composed of black historians";
4. That in the course of that speech I criticized two recent Supreme Court decisions
which involved alleged racial discrimination, and said, inter alia, that:
(a) "I do not see the [Supreme] Court of the 1970's or envision the Court of the
1980's as the major instrument for significant change and improvement in the quality of
race relations in America";
(b) "The message of these recent decisions is that if we are to deal with the concept
of integration, we must probably make our major efforts in another forum";
(c) "As I see it, we must make major efforts in other forums without exclusive reli
ance on the federal legal process."
5. That I used the pronoun "we" several times in the course of the speech, and that my
use of this pronoun evidences my "intimate tie with and emotional attachment to the
advancement of black civil rights";
6. That by my agreement to deliver the speech I presented myself as "a leader in the
future course of the black civil rights movement";
7. That my speech took place in "an extra-judicial and community context," and not in
the course of this litigation;
8. That the following day, Saturday, October 26, 1974, The Philadelphia Inquirer pub
lished "an article appearing under a predominant headline on the first page of the met
ropolitan news section, . . . describing the October 25th meeting and publishing the
aforementioned quotes";
9. That approximately 450,000 copies of The Philadelphia Inquirer containing this ac
count were distributed publicly on or about October 26, 1974;
10. That this account made "the community at large" aware of my "significant role as a
spokesman, scholar and active supporter of the advancement of the causes of
integration";

Black Attorneys

February 1997]

777

The extraordinary nature of the defendants' disqualification mo
tion did not go unnoticed by Judge Higginbotham, nor did its un
derlying assumptions about the nexus between being Black and the
ability to fulfill professional obligations of fairness and impartiality
with respect to issues of race. In an opinion even more extraordi
nary than the motion itself, Judge Higginbotham engaged in a bril
liant disquisition on racial injustice, the burdens suffered by Blacks
in the legal profession,29 and the "raced" nature of all jurispru
dence. Acknowledging the difficulty inherent in acting as "judge in
[one's] own case"30 - that is, in assessing his own impartiality, as
required by the recusal statute - Judge Higginbotham carefully ad
dressed the factual underpinnings of each of the defendants' asser
tions and responded to their claims of bias in great detail. He
explained why his pride in his heritage and commitment to racial
equality should not be viewed as a "partisan" matter that would
somehow compromise or undermine his professional integrity.31 In
rejecting the defendants' tacit presumption that a Black judge
posed a unique threat to norms of judicial neutrality with respect to
race, he commented:
[A] threshold question which might be inferred from defendants' peti
tion is: Since blacks (like most other thoughtful Americans) are
aware of the "sordid chapter in American history" of racial injustice,
shouldn't black judges be disqualified per se from adjudicating cases
involving claims of racial discrimination? ... [T]he absolute conse
quence and thrust of their rationale would amount to, in practice, a
double standard within the federal judiciary. By that standard, white
judges will be permitted to keep the latitude they have enjoyed for
centuries in discussing matters of intellectual substance, even issues of
11. That I believe "that there has been social injustice to blacks in the United States";
"that these injustices must be corrected and remedied"; and "that they must be reme
died by extra-judicial efforts by blacks, including [myself]";
12. That "the very invitation to speak," "the content of [my] remarks" and my "posing
for photographs" after the address identify me as "a leader for and among blacks," and
"one of the country's leading civil rights proponents";
13. That I am a "celebrity" within the black community ....
388 F. Supp.at 157-58 (footnotes omitted).
29. In explaining the considerable lengths undertaken to provide historical context, schol
arly documentation, and precise analytical constructs for his reasoning in denying a seem
ingly "simple" motion to recuse, Judge Higginbotham commented:
Blacks must meet not only the normal obligations which confront their colleagues, but
often they must spend extraordinary amounts of time in answering irrational positions
and assertions before they can fulfill their primary public responsibilities.
388 F.Supp. at 181-82.
30. 388 F. Supp. at 161.
31. See 388 F.Supp.at 166; see also 388 F.Supp. at 163 ("I concede that I am black. I do
not apologize for that obvious fact. I take rational pride in my heritage, just as most other
ethnics take pride in theirs. However, that one is black does not mean, ipso facto, that he is
anti-white; no more than being Jewish implies being anti-Catholic, or being Cath1Jlic implies
being anti-Protestant. . . .")
.
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human rights and, because they are white, still be permitted to later
decide specific factual situations involving the principles of human
rights which they have discussed previously in a generalized fashion.
But for black judges, defendants insist on a far more rigid standard,
which would preclude black judges from ever discussing race relations
even in the generalized fashion that other justices and judges have
discussed issues of human rights. Under defendants' standards, if a
black judge discusses race relations, he should thereafter be precluded
from adjudicating matters, involving specific claims of racial
discrimination. 32

Although Judge Higginbotham's opinion in Pennsylvania v.
Local Union 542 represents the most detailed response to a motion
for disqualification made in this vein, other Black judges have been
subjected to similar challenges. Judge Constance Baker Motley, for
example, defended her professional competence to preside over a
sex discrimination case, explaining with withering succinctness that
everyone - and not just she as a Black woman - is possessed of
racial identity and gender identity.33 Judge Higginbotham's and
Judge Motley's observations, although articulated over two decades
ago in the context of recusal challenges to the professional compe
tence of Black members of the judiciary, have enormous signifi
cance for Black lawyers today who demand mainstream respect for
and acceptance of their many-faceted roles as legal professionals
and as advocates for racial and gender justice. One of the hard
truths learned from Judges Higginbotham, Motley, and other "el
ders"34 is that "minority" race, gender, or both subject one to ongo32. 388 F. Supp. at 165 (footnotes omitted).
33. See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D. N.Y. 1975); see also
United States v. Alabama, 582 F. Supp. 1197, 1200-02 ( N.D. Ala. 1984) (Dyer, J.) (denying
motion for disqualification filed against Judge U.W. Clemon in a race segregation case after
the U.S. Court of Appeals ordered that another judge be assigned to hear the recusal pro
ceedings); Paschall v. Mayone, 454 F. Supp. 1289, 1301 (S.D. N.Y. 1978) (Carter, J.) (denying
motion for disqualification in race discrimination case). Interestingly, all three of the above
cases - as well as Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542
involved challenges to the impartiality
of Black judges who had been civil rights lawyers before their appointments to the bench.
For a recent example of the controversy surrounding a recusal motion filed against a Black
federal judge in a civil rights case, see Doug Bandow, No Justice for Proposition 209, W ASH
INGTON TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at A15 (discussing efforts to remove Judge Thelton E. Hender
son from presiding over Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1488 (1996));
Howard Mintz, Prop. 209 Defenders Struggle in Court, THE RECORDER, Dec. 17, 1996, at 1;
Carol Ness, Temporary Ban on Prop. 209 Extended to All Agencies; Preference Law's Sup
porters Seek Judge's Ouster, Citing ACLU Connections, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Dec. 17,
1996, at A3. For examples of recusal motions based on allegations of other "group"-related
loyalties, see United States v. Ibraham El-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 961-62 (S.D. N.Y.
1994) (Mukasey, J.) (denying motion for disqualification in the World Trade Center bombing
prosecution which was based in part on defense attorney William Kunstler's assertions that
Judge Mukasey's adherence to precepts of Orthodox Judaism and Zionism would cause him
to be biased against the defense and providing examples of other recusal motions).
34. For other chronicles of these "elders," see DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHOR
ITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER (1994); J.L. CHESTNUT, JR. & JULIA CASS,
-

·
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ing and pervasive assumptions of nonobjectivity and incompetence,
particularly with regard to explicitly raced or gendered cases; the
presumption is that "minority" group loyalties will taint profes
sional ethics in a way that "majority" affiliations will not. As I shall
discuss below, the present-day manifestations of these beliefs are
different only in form but not in substance from the more explicit
racial stereotypes applied to Black lawyers of earlier generations.
III.

"SELLOUTS"

AND

"RACE CARDS": THE DARDEN DILEMMA

AND THE

A.

CocHRAN CmfUNDRUM

The Darden Dilemma Redefined

In his bestselling memoir of the Simpson case, prosecutor Christopher Darden comments:
I understand that some black prosecutors have a name for the pres
sure they feel from those in the community who criticize them for
standing up and convicting black criminals. They call it the "Darden
Dilemma."35

Darden elaborates upon this theme in considerable detail through
out his book, explaining that his affection, pride, and concern for
the Black community

-

his

community - significantly motivated

his decision to seek a law degree and to become a prosecutor.36 He
informs the reader of his life-long personal and professional com
mitment to the betterment of African Americans.37 He further
points out that in his pre-Simpson prosecutorial career, he devoted

BLACK IN SELMA: THE UNCOMMON LIFE OF J.L. CHEslNUT, JR. (1990); MICHAEL D. DAVIS
& HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARsHALL: WARRIOR i;._T THE BAR, REBEL ON THE
BENCH (1992); R ICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); GENNA RAE MC
NEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARI.Es HAMILT ON HOUSTON AND THE STRU GGLE FOR Crvrr.
RIGHTS (1983); PAULI MURRAY, SONG IN A WEARY THROAT: AN AMERICAN PILGRIMAGE
(1987); JESSIE CARNEY SMTIH, EPIC LIVES: ONE HUNDRED BLACK WOMEN WHO MADE A
DIFFERENCE (1993); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING Crvrr. RIGHTS LAW: THuRGOOD MAR
SHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 {1994); GILBERT WARE, WILLIAM HASTIE:
GRACE UNDER PRESSURE {1984); John George, Solo in Soul Country, in THE RELEVANT
LAWYERS, supra note l, at 367-82.
35. DARDEN, supra note 25, at 472-73. The so-called Darden Dilemma has persisted as a
subject of much commentary in the mainstream press - nationally and internationally even many months after the Simpson verdict. See, e.g., William Claiborne, One Angry Man:
He Couldn't Convince the Jury, but Christopher Darden Isn't Resting His Case, WASH. PoST,
Mar. 20, 1996, at Bl; Ellis Cose, The Darden Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1996, at 58; Ros
Davidson, Lawyer at Heart of Race Dilemma, S coTLAND ON SUNDAY, May 26, 1996, at 15,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws Ftle; Ken Hamblin, No Excuse for Color-Coded
Justice, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 10, 1996, at Al5, available in 1996 WL 8200403; Stebbins
Jefferson, Guilty of Having Moral Standards, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 6, 1996, at Al, avail
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
36. See DARDEN WITH WALTER, supra note 25, at 65-67, 106-07.
37. See id. at 14, 201, 471.
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considerable energies to investigating and prosecuting racist and
other lawless behavior in the Los Angeles Police Department.38
Why then, he anguishes, was he branded by some in the Black com
munity a "sellout" and a "token" for his decision to join in the pros
ecution of a wealthy Black celebrity who had evinced little concern
for Blacks and had immersed himself in white privilege throughout
his adult life? Darden laments:
I had naively believed my presence would, in some way, embolden my
black brothers and sisters, show them that this was their system as
well, that we were making progress . . . [I]nstead I was branded an
Uncle Tom, a traitor used by The Man.39

Notwithstanding what I consider to be his genuine and justifi
able torment over his apparent ostracism from some in the Black
community,40 I think that Darden's articulation of the so-called
Darden Dilemma ignores the root cause of his quandary. In his
insistence on interpreting the charges of "sellout" and "token" al
most entirely as a personal individual slight against him by the
Black community rather than as a justifiably skeptical reaction to
the broader racial implications of the supposedly colorblind
prosecutorial strategies employed in the Simpson case,41 he seems
38.
39.

See id. at 117-39.
Id. at 13-14.

40. Despite the pervasive impression that Darden was uniformly reviled and rebuffed by
a "monolithic" Black community, some Black leaders praised his work on the case and ac
knowledged the difficult nature of his role on the prosecution team. See, e.g., Andrea Ford,
Black Leaders to Honor Darden as Role Model, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at Bl; see also
Henry Weinstein, Delicate Case Ends on Up Note for Darden, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at
Al. Weinstein reported the views of two Black leaders thus:
"As an African American lawyer, I would say that the buttons on my shirt were
popping with pride - he did a magnificent job," said Reginald Holmes, former presi
dent of the Langston Bar Assn., the largest black lawyers organization in Southern
California.
. . . "From the beginning he's been in the hot seat - an almost impossible position,"
said Earl Ofari Hutchinson, veteran black activist and • • . author of the forthcoming
book "Beyond O.J.: Race, Sex, and Class Lessons for America."
"He's feeling the pressure. He's got to be mindful of the negative comments. I think
it has caused him a lot of personal discomfort and cognitive dissonance. He's in a no-win
situation."
Id. at Al8.
41. Others have articulated and emphasized quite different concerns in defining the
Darden Dilemma. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Christopher Darden: Sour Grapes From a Sore
Loser, L.A. TIMES, March 25, 1996, at BS (criticizing Darden for invoking a so-called di
lemma as an excuse to blame Black jurors for his own professional mistakes, and asserting
that Blacks generally are proud of Black prosecutors who use their power responsibly); Joan
Ullman, In Contempt, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 26, 1996, at 2 (reviewing DARDEN WITH WALTER, supra
note 25 (summarizing the underlying question posed by the Darden Dilemma as: "How can
any black prosecutor justify his role of sending more black men into prisons already over
crowded with this minority population, or worse yet, of wresting convictions that carry the
death penalty?")); James Varney, Few Black Lawyers Work for DA's Office, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 15, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File

February 1997]

Black Attorneys

781

to view his dilemma as a dichotomous conflict of a Black prosecu
tor's loyalty to justice versus obeisance to antiwhite racism in Black
communities. This interpretation is reinforced by much of the hy
perbolic and at times contemptuous public commentary that helped
construct the Darden Dilemma: the brave, law-abiding Black pros
ecutor versus the Simpson-loving, lawless Black community and ju
rors;42 the truth-seeking "colorblindness" of the State versus the
inflammatory race-baiting of the defense; the Black attorney's
choice of seeking justice (even at the risk of being called a sellout)

versus playing the race card.43 By failing to reflect upon the distor
tion of meaning inherent in such constructions, Darden was as
much a victim of these false dichotomies as he was their embodi
ment and defender.
A more nuanced understanding of the Darden Dilemma would
acknowledge the integrity of Black communities, Black jurors, and
Black attorneys in Darden's position who inevitably confront simi
lar predicaments. This reinterpretation would focus intently on the
broader legal, political, and societal framework within which all of
these actors operate.44 As discussed earlier, it is my view that
racism severely limits the public credibility and lawyering choices of
Black attorneys not only in a vertical, ladder-climbing, "glass ceil
ing" career sense, but also in terms of the latitude and autonomy
(" 'I've been battling this ever since law school in 1984,' said Orleans Parish assistant district
attorney Glen Woods, who is black. 'How can you walk in and prosecute another African
American when you know how we've been persecuted? There aren't many of us, but I'd
rather be on the inside watching white people to make sure they don't screw us over.' ).
42. For a examination of various meanings of lawbreaking to Blacks, see Regina Austin,
"The Black Community, " Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
1769 (1992).
43. Ken Hamblin provides a particularly noxious example of this false dichotomization:
We all might assume that obeying the law and applying it equally under the Constitu
tion would be a tough job for your average white racist member of the Ku Klux Klan,
the Aryan Nation or the skinheads - hypothesizing that one of them could rise to
power as a district attorney. We would demand nonetheless that they leave their bias
behind to serve as the people's counsel.
But what are the obligations of minorities? Should we allow them to maintain a
special allegiance to people of color?
"

. . . [M]inority prosecutors face people who see them as "turncoats for having the
temerity to prosecute people of color.''
I call that liberal hogwash, pure and simple. If you can't stand the heat, get out of the
kitchen. Become a social worker or go to work in the public defender's office before
pursuing the fast-track political career of a big-city prosecutor.
Stop polluting the legal profession.
Hamblin, supra note 35, at 15.
44. See, e.g., Varney, supra note 41 (discussing the complex effects of economic, political,
philosophical, and personal factors on Blacks' decisions to become prosecutors). According
to figures cited by an official of the National Black Prosecutors Association, approximately
800 (or three percent) of the 30,000 prosecutors nationwide are Black, as compared with four
percent of the defense attorneys. See id.
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that they are accorded in juggling and reconciling competing obliga
tions to Black communities and to the legal profession at large.
Moreover, as Black attorneys seek an integrated and authentic fu

sion of personal and professional identities in a legal system that
relegates them to a mere token presence, they often face confine
ment along an extremely narrow continuum of stereotypical identi
ties. If they choose a career path not typically associated with the
pursuit of racial justice - for example, corporate law or criminal
prosecution - dominant popular discourse (even more than the
"Black community") pigeonholes them with an array of labels ("as
similationist," "colorblind," "mainstream," "conservative," "sell
out"), all of which reinforce the ideology that such individuals are

divorced from their "Blackness"; Black attorneys in such a situation
face the dubious "privilege" of being rewarded and valorized by
white institutional culture for the very qualities that gamer doubt
and suspicion from minority communities.45 This contributes to the
systemic schizophrenia that lies at the heart of the Darden Di
lemma and that legitimately fuels Black community critiques in par
ticular circumstances.46
45. The role of whites - and not just or even primarily Blacks - in constructing and
perpetuating these assumptions should not be underestimated. Consider also the vastly dif
ferent ideological concerns that may undergird majority attitudes in their relations with so
called assimilationist Blacks in the context of the following retrospective on the life of Ron
ald H. Brown, the Black commercial lawyer and former Democratic National Committee
chairperson who served as Commerce Secretary in the Clinton administration:
Some viewed Mr. Brown {the son of a middle-class family) as proof that race is no
longer a barrier to success; that policies such as affirmative action - which they consider
unfair anyway - should be jettisoned. "By any definition, he was an amazing success in
the American political arena," said Clint Bolick, vice president of the Institute for Jus
tice, a public interest law firm that opposes affirmative action. "It kind of proves that
the American system works; that if you've got brains and talent you can rise to the top
regardless of your race."
• . • [M]any people, particularly business executives he dealt with as Commerce Secre
tary, say they did not see his race at all when they looked at him, just skill at deal-making
and promoting American business interests abroad.

Steven A. Holmes, Remembering Ron Brown: So Visible, but From Which Angle?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, § 4, at 1. Assertions such as the one made by Bolick reveal an ignorance
of - or perhaps refusal to respect - Mr. Brown's relations with the community as well as his
concerns for Black community empowerment.
46. There is some indication that the much-publicized Darden Dilemma has engendered
broader public awareness of the persistence of these concerns among Blacks at least to a
limited extent. Steven Holmes writes:
[I]f Mr. Brown evokes a confusion, it is focused mainly among whites. For in his adept
ness at playing many roles, he was the very model for the increased number of blacks
striding into the professional class - with varying degrees of success - who must strad
dle two different and often mutually suspicious worlds. As they deal with enhanced
opportunities, glass ceilings, grumblings from whites that they are too willing to play the
race card, and self-doubts about whether they are becoming Uncle Toms, they can look
at Mr. Brown and see something startlingly familiar. Themselves.
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On the other hand, Black attorneys who select a career typically
thought of as more "community-oriented" in nature - for exam
ple, civil rights or criminal defense - are often accorded a different
set of labels equally superficial and inadequate, which express dom
inant cultural assumptions that their race-based advocacy as well as
their race compromise their ·ethics and their professionalism. Both
models are founded upon an atomistic conception of the Black at
torney as a solo agent who must somehow both represent and tran
scend categorical assumptions about her race.
Unfortunately, at present the burgeoning genre of legal litera
ture on lawyering theory includes little to address these concerns2
but a few notable exceptions exist. For example, in a recent essay
Paul Butler effectively describes the genesis of his own "prosecu
tor's dilemma" as deriving not from any unfair, externally imposed
community pressure, but from his own introspection and evolving
self-critique regarding the paradoxical nature of his work:
I was a Special Assistant United States Attorney in the District of
Columbia in 1990. I prosecuted people accused of misdemeanor
crimes, mainly the drug and gun cases that overwhelm the local courts
of most American cities. As a federal prosecutor, I represented the
United States of America and used that power to put people, mainly
African-American men, in prison. I am also an African-American
man. While at the U.S. Attorney's office, I made two discoveries that
profoundly changed the way I viewed my work as a prosecutor and
my responsibilities as a black person.
The first discovery occurred during a training session for new As
sistants conducted by experienced prosecutors. We rookies were in
formed that we would lose many of our cases, despite having
persuaded a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
guilty. We would lose because some black jurors would refuse to con
vict black defendants who they knew were guilty.
The second discovery was related to the first, but was even more
unsettling. It occurred during the trial of Marion Barry, then the sec
ond-term mayor of the District of Columbia. Barry was being prose
cuted by my office for drug possession and perjury. I learned, to my
surprise, that some of my fellow African-American prosecutors hoped
that the mayor would be acquitted, despite the fact that he was obvi
ously guilty of at least one of the charges - he had smoked cocaine
on FBI videotape. These black prosecutors wanted their office to lose
its case because they believed that the prosecution of Barry was
.
ra��

Id. at 4. For a more extended consideration of the burdens of Black professional life, see
ELLIS CosE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLAss (1993); JoE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES,
LIVING WITH RACISM: THE B LACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE (1994).
47. Butler, supra note 15, at

678 (footnotes omitted).
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Butler proceeds from these perceptions to question the broader
racial implications of his own prosecutorial role, and to advance the
thesis that the. race of a Black defendant is "sometimes a legally and
morally appropriate factor for jurors to consider in reaching a ver
dict of not guilty or for an individual juror to consider in refusing to
vote for conviction."48
In a related vein, David Wilkins examines the dilemmas of
Black law students and attorneys who seek to integrate a career in
corporate law with goals of racial justice and Black community re
sponsibility, and advances an "obligation thesis" that urges "black
corporate lawyers to recognize that they have moral obligations
running to the black community that must be balanced against
other legitimate professional duties and personal commitments
when deciding on particular actions and, more generally, when con
structing a morally acceptable life plan."49 To this end, Wilkins rec
ommends that law schools take an active role in assisting Black law
students in acquiring the critical skills and empirical knowledge
needed to avoid the pressures of assimilation and seeming "race
neutrality" that attends corporate legal practice.so
The Darden Dilemma, then, might be more usefully and broadly
explored as an ongoing interplay of competing values within Black
attorneys who are attemptjng to puzzle through the implications of
their professional choices for the well-being of Black communities.
This inner tension may be influenced, heightened, and at times per
haps exacerbated by Black community critiques, but it is inherently
and inevitably a result of a legal system that devalues all Black
lives, including the token Black attorneys it ostensibly valorizes as
the honored few.

According to this proposed redefinition, the

Black community did not create the Darden Dilemma, nor did
Christopher Darden or Black prosecutors generally. Rather, it is an
unavoidable structural component of a legal system originated and
maintained under racial hierarchy. Armed with this revelation,
Black attorneys can be empowered to
than be relegated to them.

expand their

choices, rather

Indeed, given the seeming inevitability of the Darden Dilemma
and other paradoxes in the Black lawyer's experience, it would
appear to be a sign of mental health that Black lawyers and Black
communities continue to experience and express cognitive disso48. Id. at 679.
supra note 18, at
50. See id. at 1984, 2013-26.
49. Wiikins,

1984.
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nance and chronic dissatisfaction with their assigned lot in the legal
system.51 In this regard, the Darden Dilemma might be reclaimed
and revitalized by Black attorneys and Black communities as a basis
for reconnection and debate.52 I would hope that this reconnection
would . differ greatly from the wearying pressures of majority
imposed race work discussed above, in that the underlying notions
of obligation would be developed through community-based reflec
tion, rather than through the norms of mainstream legal practice.
B.

The Fallacy of Colorblind Lawyering

The above-proposed redefinition of the Darden Dilemma also
can serve to question an overly rigid adherence to notions of color
blindness in lawyering strategy. In using the term "colorblind"
lawyering, I draw upon the work of critical race theory, which ex
plores broadly the premise that ineradicable currents of racism per
vade the law, and advances race consciousness as a method of
analyzing and ameliorating racism's effects.53 Critical race theorists
challenge prevailing assumptions that race and color are social and
legal categories that can be made not to matter simply by pronounc
ing them - even from a hopeful, liberal standpoint - to be incon
sequential. According to these critiques, the most perilous fallacy
of colorblind ideology is that it is wishful or wilful determiriation, or
both, to ignore historical and systemic racism perpetuates the false
belief that "racelessness" is equivalent to neutrality, objectivity,
fairness, and equality.54 As applied to the lawyering process, I in
tend the term "colorblind" lawyering to connote advocacy strate51. In her memoirs of her life of "volunteer slavery" as a Black journalist in predomi
nantly white environments, Jill Nelson vividly describes the mental and emotional strains
involved in the juggling of contradictory professional and personal identities:
I've also been doing the standard Negro balancing act when it comes to dealing with
white folks, which involves sufficiently blurring the edges of my being so that they don't
feel intimidated, while simultaneously holding on to my integrity. There is a thin line
between Uncle Tomming and Mau-Mauing. To fall off that line can mean disaster. On
one side lies employment and self-hatred: on the other, the equally dubious honor of
unemployment with integrity. Walking that line as if it were a tightrope results in some
thing like employment with honor, although I'm not sure exactly how that works.
JILL NELSON, VOLUNTEER SLAVERY 10 (1993).
52. Consider how Delgado urges the rejection of externally imposed "role model" bur
dens in favor of a more liberating relationship between minority legal professionals and their
communities. See Delgado, supra note 9, at 1230-31.
53. For recent critiques of colorblind mythology, see generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique
1 (1991); HANEY L6PEZ, supra note

of "Our Constitution is Co/or-Blind, " 44 STAN. L. REV.
2; Harris, supra note 8.

54. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, a principal critical race theorist, elucidates this point in writ
ing that the ostensible "objectivity of legal analysis is grounded in the apparent perspective
lessness of the dominant discourse." Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a
Race-Conscious Pedagogy In Legal Education, 11 NATL. BLACK L.J. 1, 12 (1989).
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gies premised upon the position that racism is or should be
characterized as irrelevant to a particular context, even if it has
been otherwise raised in the proceedings.ss
In the Simpson case, this norm turned out to be of paramount
and ultimately dispositive significance, particularly given Darden's
vociferous public insistence from early in the proceedings that race
was not an issue in the case. From a critical race-conscious as well
as a pragmatic perspective, the flawed and indeed misleading na
ture of the publicly advanced prosecutorial stance of colorblindness
is obvious. Even within the framework of the prosecution's prof
fered theory of the case, there would have been a significant differ
ence between arguing the indeterminate or minimal role of racism
in the case in chief and claiming that allegations of racism were sim
ply irrelevant. Regardless of one's view of the strength of the case
against Simpson - and indeed regardless of one's view of who was
responsible for first articulating race as a factor - issues of race
permeated the case from its inception: from prosecutorial strate
gies regarding where to try the case; to the acquiescence on both
sides to try the case in part in the voyeuristic "court of public opin
ion"; to both sides' selection of jurors and counsel; and so forth.s6
Against this backdrop, the prosecution's repeated assertions that
race was not an issue in the case appeared not only wishful and
deluded, but deliberately misleading. Although the prosecution's
stance is more accurately and comprehensibly explained as the ar
gument that race was irrelevant to the factual predicates of the de
fendant's guilt or innocence, this point was obscured by the
prosecution's broader rhetorical incantation of the "race doesn't
matter" theme. This strategic stance of avowed "racelessness" in
the face of the realities of the unfolding Simpson defense and its
broader social context illustrate the fallacy of colorblind lawyering:
pretending and asserting that race doesn't matter is not equivalent
to neutrality and "perspectivelessness. "S7 In fact, it is a perspective:
one of studied indifference to the significance of race.
55. For a race-conscious critique of the "liberal regime" of colorblindness in criminal de
fense advocacy, see Alfieri, supra note 18, at 1331-32 (arguing for the "race-ing" of legal
ethics with regard to criminal defense lawyers' deployment of disempowering racial
narratives).
56. As Brent Staples observes:
The statement that race had no place in the trial is dishonest on its face. The so
called race card was played when District Attorney Gil Garcetti decided to try the case
before a mainly black jury downtown instead of before a white jury in Santa Monica.
Conviction by a mainly black jury would insulate Mr. Garcetti from riots like those that
accompanied the acquittal of the white policemen who beat Rodney King.
Brent Staples, Millions for Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1996, § 7 (Book Review), at 15.
57. On "perspectivelessness," see Crenshaw, supra note 54, at 10-12.
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The misguided and unrealistic adoption of a model of colorblind
lawyering can pose especially onerous pressures on the Black attor
ney. In seeking to reconcile a stated professional - and perhaps
even personal - norm of colorblind ideology with the personal ex
periential knowledge that of course race does matter significantly in
the legal system, whether or not one wants it to matter, the Black
attorney in such a situation encounters the daunting task of synthe
sizing conflicting ethical, personal, and advocacy priorities.
Thus, for example, Darden undermined his own colorblind
lawyering strategy in one of the most highly publicized Darden
Cochran conflicts of the proceedings: his courtroom battle with
Cochran over the admissibility of testimony regarding prosecution
witness Mark Fuhrman's use of the epithet "nigger." Darden's ulti
mately

unsuccessful

argument for

exclusion

reflected

simul

taneously the colorblind position that race was not and should not
be allowed to develop as a factor in the case, and the tacitly race
conscious realization that the racist utterances of a key witness
would be of dispositive significance to the Black jurors:

If you allow Mr. Cochran to use this word and play the race card
. . . the direction and focus of the case changes: it is a race case now.
It becomes an issue of color . . . . It becomes a question of who is
the blackest man up here . . . .
It's the filthiest, dirtiest, nastiest word in the English language . . . .
It will do one thing. It will upset the black jurors. It will say, Whose
side are you on, "the man" or "the brothers"?
. . . There's a mountain of evidence pointing to this man's guilt, but
when you mention that word to this jury, or any African-American, it
blinds people. It'll blind the jury. It'll blind the truth. They won't be
able to discern what's true and what's not.58

Given that - as argued above - every case argued by a Black
attorney is at some level a "race case" in which the Black attorney
is forced to represent race beyond the boundaries of the particular
dispute in question, an ideology of colorblind lawyering puts the
58. Kenneth B. Noble, Issue of Racism Erupts in Simpson Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
1995, at 7. To this argument, Cochran responded:
It's demeaning to our jury . . . to say that African-Americans who've lived under
oppression for 200-plus years in this country cannot work in the mainstream. African
Americans live with offensive words, offensive looks, offensive treatment every day of
their lives. And yet they still believe in this country.
Id.; see also Wtlliam Carlsen, Race Issue Finally Boils Over in Simpson Hearing, S.F. CHR.oN.,
Jan. 14, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL 5261467; Tony Freemantle, Pair Argue Disclosure
ofEpithets, HOUSTON CHRoN., Jan. 14, 1995, at l, available in 1995 WL 5882802; Lisa Resper
et al., Blacks Debate Issue of Race in Simpson Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at Al; Ed
Vulliamy, N-Word Stirs 0./. Trial's Racial Cauldron, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 22,
1995, at 16, available in 1995 WL 7575906.
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Black attorney at a serious disadvantage: she must deny the reali
ties of racism in order to appear balanced and fair in advaneing the
case of the client. The pervasive and systemic role of racism in the
legal system belies the assumption that the world can be neatly di
vided into "race cases" and "nonrace cases." Repudiating color
blind lawyering does not mean making race the primary focus of
every case, but it does require a thorough and honest response
when race is articulated as even arguably an influence.

In sum, then, an ideology of colorblind lawyering has the poten
tial to exacerbate further the professional and personal predica
ment of the Black attorney, whose everyday experiences as a
lawyer underscore the reminder that issues of race matter enor
mously. This phenomenon may consign the attorney to the adop
tion of legal categories and strategies not reflective of the
paradoxical nature of her role, which in turn may engender criti
cisms that the lawyer has simply abandoned or sold out Black com
munity concerns. To conclude that a particular Black attorney in
such a situation is a sellout or mere assimilationist - without ad
dressing the insidiousness of the underlying welter of constraints is to ignore the asphyxiating conditions in which many Black attor
neys must pursue their careers.
C.

The Cochran Conundrum: Accusations of Playing the Race
Card and the Perils of Race-Conscious Lawyering

If the Darden Dilemma may be reinterpreted to describe one
set of constraints imposed upon Black attorneys, I use the term
Cochran Conundrum to characterize another set of obstacles, en
countered most frequently by Black lawyers who openly articulate
issues of racism as relevant to a particular case. The name - de
rived, of course, from mainstream public and media reaction to
Johnnie Cochran's explicitly race-based arguments in the Simpson
case59 - is meant to suggest that certain elements of the vehement
59.

See, e.g., Joseph Demma & Shirley E. Perlman, Wrangling over "Race Card, " NEWS
14, 1995, at A7, available in LEXIS, News Library, NEWSDY file; Bill Maxwell,
Intraracism Snares Chris Darden, Aruz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1995, at BS, available in 1995 WL

DAY, Jan.

2840305 ("The truth is that, along with using race as a blunt instrument against whites, blacks
use it to craft relations with one another . • . . [T]he defense, led by the brilliant Johnnie
Cochran, played the intrarace card . . . . "); Joseph Wambaugh, Perspective on the Simpson
Case; The Race Card, from Bottom of Deck, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1995, at B9 (calling
Cochran's allegations of racism in public perceptions of the case "black racism" and conclud·
ing that "Johnnie Cochran has not only played the race card, he's dealt it from the bottom of
the deck"). For an example of the ironic use of race-card terminology to criticize anti-Black
attitudes, see Anthony Lewis, Trust Gone Bust in a Divided America, HousTON CHRoN.,
Oct. 9, 1995, at 22, available in 1995 WL 9408020 ("Even before the verdict some politicians
and intellectuals were playing the race card to whites, arguing that blacks were too demand·
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criticism directed against Cochran are representative of the disap
proval faced by lawyers who implement race-conscious strategies in
client representation. The current manifestation of this deep-seated
disdain is the accusation that one is "playing the race card" and
therefore unfairly skewing reasonable debate on the "merits" of a
case by insisting that racism is a relevant issue in an otherwise race
less context.60
Although the genesis of the phrase "playing the race card" pre
cedes the Simpson case, the term has achieved widespread usage
through its frequent invocation in public discourse during and now
after the trial to describe and deride various aspects of the Simpson
defense-team strategy. Christopher Darden himself introduced the
phrase into the trial proceedings at an early stage in rebutting
Cochran's claim that Darden had been added to the prosecution
team "just to show that if a black prosecutor sees O.J. guilty, he is
being judged by the evidence at hand and not for some deep-seated
bias."61 At another odd juncture, Darden advanced the race-card
accusation when he and Cochran bickered over Darden's attempt
to ask a witness whether he had described a certain person's voice
as "sound[ing] like the voice of a Black man."62 And, as noted
above, Darden argued that Cochran was playing the race card in
ing. The greater danger of the Simpson verdict and the reactions to it is that the white major
ity will tum even further against measures to ameliorate inequalities of opportunity.").
60. Interestingly, there is rarely discussion of what exactly the phrase "playing the race
card" means in any individual context, although the accusation is often lodged with a casual
ness suggestive of an insider's "shorthand" - as though the reader will of course understand
the author's meaning. In response, one might usefully invoke Angela Davis's blunt re
minder: "Race is not a card." See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a
Black Man, NEW YORI<ER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 59. In an editorial assessing the closing
arguments in the case, the New York Times offered some detail to its invocation of the
criticism:
Mr. Cochran, showing the knack for the theatrics that successful trial lawyers need,
argued forcibly and fairly that the racism and perjury on the part of former Los Angeles
detective Mark Fuhrman cast doubt on Mr. Fuhrman's credibility and justified skepti
cism about some evidence. But he crossed a line when he urged the jury to look beyond
the specifics of the O.J. case and send a broader message that would help "police the
police" everywhere and stop further misbehavior by racist cops.
This was playing the race card with irresponsible sweep and remarkable viciousness.
Race Cards and Rebuttals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1995, at 18 (editorial).
61. Maxwell, supra note 59.
62. For a transcript of this exchange as covered by the Cable News Network, see Testi
mony of Robert Heidstra, Cable News Network, Transcript #110-4, July 12, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Script File. In a particularly unfortunate colloquy, Cochran insisted
that Darden's question itself was "racist": "You can't tell by listening to someone whether
they're black [or] white. . . • I think it's totally improper in America at this time in 1995 just to
hear this and endure this." Annette Kornblum, ls Race-Tagging a Voice Talkin' Trash or
Truth? What Science Says About Speech and Stereotypes, WASH. PosT, July 23, 1995, at CJ
(quoting Cochran and discussing ebonies, the linguistic study of "Black English," including
the sound, inflection, rhythm, and pitch of its various colloquial dialects).
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seeking to introduce into evidence Mark Fuhrman's use of the word
"nigger. "63
Although Darden's early and uninhibited use of the race-card
trope in court did much to encourage its usage in public and media
commentary, the saying attracted the most attention and acquired
an almost talismanic significance when uttered by Robert Shapiro,
Cochran's co-counsel, in a television interview shortly after the ver
dict. Shapiro, who is white, publicly and emphatically disavowed
what he suggested was a manipulative and inappropriate use of race
in his own co-counsel's defense strategy. Shapiro singled out
Cochran with particular ire for including in his closing arguments
rhetorical references to Hitler and the Holocaust in castigating the
Los Angeles Police Department's failure to address the racist be
havior of Mark Fuhrman. Shapiro asserted: "My position was al
ways the same, that race would not and should not be a part of this
case. I was wrong. Not only did we play the race card, we dealt it
from the bottom of the deck."64
As emphasized from the outset, my focus is neither the sub
stance of the Simpson prosecution itself nor the relative merits of
individual lawyering strategies in the context of that case. One may
legitimately view Cochran or Darden as a hero, foe, or pawn; one
may legitimately view the now undisputed racism of Fuhrman as a
controlling, major, or minor factor in the ultimate merits of the
prosecution's case. But, I contend, the vituperation with which
Cochran was labeled as, for example, an "oleaginous"65 shyster who
"shamelessly and shamefully stoked fires of racial animosity in the
attempt to get his client off"66 reveals far more than an individual
ized assessment of Cochran's capabilities as a lawyer. Outside the
context of race - that is, both Cochran's and his client Simpson's
race - Cochran's strategy might have been evaluated by his critics
in more conventional terms as a zealous defense attorney's claim
that the bias of a key prosecution witness was a highly relevant fac
tor in assessing the prosecution's case; but because race - espe
cially Cochran's race - powerfully affected public perceptions of
his lawyering role, he became responsible for representing race it63.
64.

See Noble, supra note 58.

Staples, supra note 56.
See Joan Beck, It's Boiling Down to Race - Again; the Nation Has Had Enough of
Trying to Stomach OJ. "the Victim, " CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 15, 1995, at 21.
66. Taki Theadoracopoulos, DJ's Lawyers Play the Race-Hate Card, THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 19, 1995, at 11.
65.
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self.67 Thus, one commentator in essence blamed Cochran for the
nation's continuing racial tensions:
Were it not for the call by Simpson's black lawyer to the predomi
nantly black jury to remember "you're the ones at war" against the
racist whit� P<?lice - blatantly urging jurors to ignore the evidence of
murder and to get even for society's past injustices - then the coun
try quickly could have healed its' wound.68

In my view, such venomous criticism is rooted in part in the sus
picion and mistrust to which Black attorneys are subjected more
broadly. Cochran had not only engaged in what his critics consid
ered to be inappropriate advocacy; he had also violated a social ta
boo by rendering painfully explicit the racial overtones that had
suffused the case from its inception. The angry, contemptuous na
ture of the playing-the-race-card accusation - lodged against the
Simpson defense team generally but with particular scorn and fe
rocity against Cochran - epitomizes the resistance and even cen
sure encountered by attorneys who use individual cases to pose
broad critiques against systemic and institutional racism. When the
"card-playing" attorneys happen to be Black, the hostility is com
pounded by underlying assumptions that of course Blacks cannot be
trusted to "play fair" or to act responsibly with respect to issues of
race. Thus, an explicit strategic decision to employ race-based ad
vocacy is evaluated not only on professional terms but on deeply
visceral ones. Such a decision runs the risk of being lambasted as
whining, pandering, trickery, demagoguery, or manipulation; the
advocate, in turn, must be prepared to be viewed in the lowest pos
sible regard - even for a lawyer, or for a defense lawyer ·at that.

It is difficult to ignore the connections between context-specific
invocations of the race-card accusation and the far-reaching animus
with which explicitly antiracist, race-conscious critiques are met in a

67. For the viewpoint that Cochran's courtroom strategy was "applied critical race the
ory," see Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, THE NEW REPUBUC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27
("[S]urely the most striking example of the influence of the critical race theorists on the
American legal system is the OJ. Simpson case, in which Johnnie L. Cochran dramatically
enacted each of the most controversial postulates of the movement before a transfixed and
racially divided nation."). In my view, Rosen's assertion is highly questionable in at least two
of its implicit assumptions: (1) that Cochran, a veteran defense attorney whose courtroom
style and strategic sense are the products of decades of litigation, was influenced in any sig
nificant sense during the Simpson trial by the writings of critical race theorists; and (2) that
Cochran's courtroom strategy exemplifies tenets of critical race theory any more than, say,
pragmatic criminal defense representation. Rather, I contend, the "striking," "dramatic,"
and "controversial" characteristics to which Rosen refers stem at least as much from specta
tors' reaction to Cochran as a forceful and persuasive Black male advocate as from the puta
tive novelty of his arguments.
68. William Satire, After the Aftermath: Damage Done, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 13,
1995, at Al9, available in 1995 WL 6556856.
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variety of contexts.69 Like the proliferation of charges of "political
correctness" in academic and popular discourse in the early 1990s,7o
the increasingly widespread and cynical iteration of playing the race
card today substitutes mockery and trivialization for thoughtful re
action and response. Ironically but perhaps not so unintentionally,
such pejorative denunciations themselves function as trumps by im
pugning not just the comments but the very integrity of the "race
talking" advocate; the not-so-subtle implication is that talking
about race has turned into a matter of sophistry, gamesmanship,
and hyperbole. The intolerance conveyed by such an accusation
serves a policing function by warning the would-be race-card trans
gressor that his or her complaints of racism will be interpreted as
irrelevant, self-serving, and maliciously advanced.
What, then, are the implications of the Cochran Conundrum for
the Black lawyer who attempts to raise issues of race in a legal pro
ceeding? As noted above, one primary concern is the likelihood
that one's very integrity and credibility will be called into question
to a degree that white colleagues do not experience; like Black
judges who have suffered the insults of motions for disqualification
filed simply because they are Black judges in "race" cases, the
Black lawyer will be presumed incompetent to meet the ethical de
mands of her professional - albeit advocacy, rather than judicial
- role. This presumption renders race-conscious lawyering a Sisy
phean task: the Black lawyer must - again and again - monitor
and evaluate the effects of her own racial identity on decision
makers' perceptions of the race-conscious strategies employed.
A second and more daunting effect of the Cochran Conundrum,
however, is the deleterious impact that it may exert on the develop
ment of creative, progressive, and radical lawyering strategies and
critiques. Like all innovations, race-conscious lawyering will have a
chance to develop only if lawyers are given the latitude to theorize
about the connections between individual cases and a broader soci-

69. See, for example, Peter Collier and David Horowitz's castigation of Today show host
Bryant Gumbel and actor Laurence Fishburne for complaining about Hollywood racism:
It was quite a spectacle. Here were two men making millions of dollars as African
American megastars, complaining about the white conspiracy to deny them success
Deploring the unreformable reality of American racism has become a ritual for Afri
can-American celebrities, almost like presenting an apartheid pass in order to retain
their status in the community, even when their life experiences argue the exact opposite.
Peter Collier & David Horowitz, Hollywood's "Racism" Not So Black and White, S.F. EXAM
INER, Sept 19, 1993, at D3, available in 1993 WL 8588751.
70. For an overview of the "political correctness" debate and its implications, see gener
ally DEBATING P.C.: THE CoNTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE
CAMPUSES (Paul Berman ed., 1992); TODD GITUN, THE TWILIOIIT OF COMMON DREAMS:
WHY AMERICA Is WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995).
.

.

•
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etal framework of racial hierarchy.71 Given the current climate of
resistance to such approaches, fewer and fewer advocates will
choose to suffer the repercussions of being accused of playing the
race card.

IV.

CONCLUS I ON : ES CAPING THE STRAITJACKET

Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the heavily emphasized
intrarace conflict between Cochran and Darden - and the
metanarrative of "Black versus Black" animus upon which it
seemed to capitalize - was the extent to which it neglected to ad
dress the preconstructed nature of their differences.

Although

Cochran and Darden, to be sure, embody different generational
perspectives on and strategic approaches to their conceptions of
what it means to be a Black attorney, their conflict was constructed
in the sense that it was structured and influenced by racial attitudes
and assumptions beyond their understanding and control. More
over, it was worsened by the dominant gaze of media frenzy,72 espe
cially the omnipresent voyeurism induced by cameras in the
courtroom. At times, lamentably, both attorneys seemed to fuel
this metanarrative of intraracial hostility by reserving their most an
tagonistic courtroom battles for racially charged conflicts with each
other.73 Within the limited parameters of adversarial combat over
the fate of O.J. Simpson and the tragically lost lives of Nicole
Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, each attorney invoked arguably necessarily - choices of lawyering strategy destined to pit
one against the other on issues of race. These issues transcended perhaps equally necessarily - the particulars of the case and con
tributed to the transformation of Cochran and Darden into compet
ing symbols of Black legal professionalism.
71. Integral to the race-conscious critical project is the exploration of gender and sexual
orientation hierarchies, as well as racial and color hierarchies. Certainly, important gender
issues (especially domestic violence) were deliberately and strategically subordinated in the
race-conscious lawyering of the Simpson defense team.
72. See Margaret M. Russell, Race and the Dominant Gaze: Narratives of Law and Ine
quality in Popular Film, 15 LEGAL Srun. F. 243, 244 (1991) (using feminist theorist Laura
Mulvey's critique of the "male gaze" to describe the "dominant gaze" of media, which tends
"to objectify and trivialize the racial identity and experiences of people of color, even when it
purports to represent them").
73. Sadly, at times these showdowns assumed a stagy, almost circus-like quality. For ex
ample, in their heated courtroom exchange over the admissibility of Fuhrrnan's use of racial
epithets, Cochran turned to address Darden directly and chided: "I'm ashamed for Mr.
Darden to allow himself to become an apologist for this man." Noble, supra note 58.
Darden was equally churlish toward Cochran throughout the trial, at one point turning to
him to assert: "That's what has created a lot of problems for my family and myself, state
ments that you make about me and race." Simmering Ito Boils After Bickering, ST. PETERS
BURG TIMES, July 13, 1995, at Al.
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Recognition of and resistance to the construction and accentua
tion of intraracial conflict is critically important in seeking to pre
serve relationships not only among Black lawyers, but also between
those lawyers and Black communities.

Racial hierarchy is well

served by microcosmic patterns of seemingly idiosyncratic spats and
divisions among Black attorneys. As long as Black attorneys and
their communities fritter away precious energy and resources en
gaging in personal sniping, we will have few opportunities to chal
lenge the broader framework of legal dysfunction that encompasses
us all.
As argued above, erroneous constructions and false dichotomies
deprive Black attorneys who seek to serve their communities of
critically needed latitude; because of the straitjacketing effects of
contemporary legal practice, Black attorneys have not even begun
to have the opportunity to explore difficult questions of legal pro
fessionalism, ethics, community identification, race-conscious
lawyering strategies, or political agenda formation.74 Moving be
yond the false dichotomies requires the realization that they serve
the regressive purpose of miring Black lawyers and their communi
ties in self-hatred and disrespect; such dichotomies must be sup
planted

by

broader

visions

of

lawyering

than

the

narrow

constructions that exist today. This is indeed a daunting task, but,
as Judge Higginbotham suggested a generation ago, Black attorneys
have always had to shoulder the burdens of representing race in
more ways than one.

74. For a persuasive argument that mainstream legal education should shoulder at least
some responsibility for fostering these debates for the benefit of Black law students planning
to enter the corporate sector, see generally Wilkins, supra note 18.

